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Preserving Access to Tattoos: First Amendment 
Trumps Municipal Ban in Anderson v. City of 
Hermosa Beach 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision Anderson v. City of 
Hermosa Beach,1 the court held that a municipal ban on tattoo 
parlors violates the First Amendment. Particularly, the Ninth Circuit 
diverged from the rulings of other jurisdictions to conclude that the 
business, process, and nature of tattooing are purely expressive 
activities entitled to robust First Amendment protection. After more 
than thirty years of courts getting it wrong, the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion correctly reevaluates the purely expressive nature of 
tattooing to conclude that tattoos are protected speech. 
Nevertheless, while the Ninth Circuit’s decision aptly interpreted 
First Amendment protection and precedent, it went too far when it 
invalidated the Hermosa Beach ban as an unreasonable time, place, 
or manner restriction. 
Parts II and III of this Note examine relevant First Amendment 
jurisprudence as well as the history and nature of tattoos generally. 
Part IV of this Note addresses the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in 
Anderson. Part V analyzes the Anderson decision in light of existing 
case law and Supreme Court precedent, concluding that while the 
court’s analysis of the tattooing process and business as “purely 
expressive” speech is correct, it erred in concluding that the 
Hermosa Beach ban is an unreasonable time, place, or manner 
restriction. Part VI offers a brief conclusion.  
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff Johnny Anderson ran Yer Cheat’n Heart tattoo parlor in 
Redondo Beach, within the City of Los Angeles. He wanted to open 
another parlor in the City of Hermosa Beach.2 Hermosa Beach lies 
within the County of Los Angeles, and while the City of Los Angeles 
 
 1. 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 2. Id. at 1055.  
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generally permits tattoo establishments, Hermosa Beach does not.3 
Hermosa Beach Municipal Code § 17.06.070 states: “Except as 
provided in this title, no building shall be erected, reconstructed or 
structurally altered, nor shall any building or land be used for any 
purpose except as hereinafter specifically provided . . . .”4 The Code 
subsequently permits several kinds of businesses, such as restaurants, 
bars, and gun shops, but no provision in the zoning code allows 
tattoo parlors.5  
In August 2006, Anderson filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, alleging that § 17.06.070 was unconstitutional under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.6 The Central District of 
California dismissed Anderson’s suit, alleging that it was not ripe for 
review because he had not yet asked for permission to open a tattoo 
parlor.7 Thereafter, Anderson requested to open a tattoo 
establishment within Hermosa Beach under the city code’s provision 
allowing establishments not specifically listed in the statute to 
operate if the business could be classified as a “similar use.”8 
Anderson’s request was denied by the city’s Community 
Development Director, and in 2007 he reinitiated his action in 
federal court to strike down the city’s ordinance.9 
A. The District Court’s Ruling 
Upon filing the case in district court, both parties moved for 
summary judgment.10 The district court granted Hermosa Beach’s 
motion and denied Anderson’s, holding that “the act of tattooing” is 
not protected expression under the First Amendment because, 
although it is non-verbal conduct expressive of an idea, it is not 
‘sufficiently imbued with the elements of communication’”11 that are 
required to receive First Amendment protection under Spence v. 
 
 3. Id. at 1056–57.  
 4. HERMOSA BEACH, CAL., MUNICIPAL. CODE § 17.06.070, available at 
http://www.hermosabch.org/departments/cityclerk/code/1706.html#070. 
 5. Id. at § 17.06.030. 
 6. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1057.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 1057–58. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)). 
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Washington.12 Because the court did not consider tattooing 
protected speech, mere rational basis review was required in order to 
uphold Hermosa Beach’s ordinance.13 As such, in light of the 
“health risks inherent in operating tattoo parlors,”14 Hermosa Beach 
possessed a rational basis for excluding tattoo parlors, and thus the 
ordinance stood. Anderson appealed the ruling to the Ninth 
Circuit.15 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND  
A. First Amendment Protected Speech 
The First Amendment, as incorporated and applied against the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits government 
restrictions on free speech.16 However, within this broad rule rest 
several exceptions. Indeed, depending on the type of speech, First 
Amendment protection may or may not apply. In the broad 
continuum of speech, “pure” speech involves actual expressive 
activity, such as writing a book or giving a public oration.17 Pure 
speech is afforded the most protection under the Constitution. 
Additionally, conduct that is not “pure” speech but has a 
communicative aspect, such as burning a draft card, wearing an 
armband, or distorting the American flag, generally also receives 
some First Amendment protection.18 
Nevertheless, even if speech is considered purely expressive in 
itself, as opposed to conduct that communicates, such a finding does 
not give the person a free pass to “speak” in all circumstances. For 
instance, a city or jurisdiction may be able to regulate the time, 
place, or manner of the speech, provided such a regulation is (1) 
content-neutral, (2) in furtherance of a significant government 
interest, (3) narrowly tailored, and (4) leaves open alternative 
channels of communication of the information.19 Expressive conduct 
 
 12. 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).  
 13. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  
 16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 17. Beth Waldock Houck, Comment, Spinning the Wheel After Roulette: How (and 
Why) to Overturn a Sidewalk Sitting Ban, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1451, 1469 (2000).  
 18. Id.  
 19. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).  
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may also be regulated under the test promulgated in United States v. 
O’Brien,20 which permits narrowly tailored regulation in light of an 
“important or substantial government interest” that is unrelated to 
the suppression of speech.21  
While both pure speech and expressive conduct are considered 
sacred under the First Amendment,22 and are at least presumptively 
protected subject to the various tests listed above, other forms of 
speech are not afforded similar protection. For instance, conduct that 
is not “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,”23 or in 
other words, conduct that does not obviously communicate an idea, 
is not similarly exempted. Likewise, conduct that may have certain 
harmful effects may be regulated even if the conduct is obviously 
communicative in nature. For example, adult movie theaters24 and 
nude dancing25 are considered “communicative” in nature but can 
still be constitutionally regulated and banned in a number of areas. 
B. The Tattoo: A Profession and an Art? 
A tattoo is an image or word engrafted onto a person’s body. 
Often termed “body art,” tattoos were first used as early as 5000 
years ago.26 Later, tattoos became associated with two societal 
groups: prisoners and members of the armed forces.27 Now, tattoos 
have gained significant popularity with teenagers, celebrities, and 
other broad groups within society. Indeed, in 1982 the Governor’s 
Office of California issued a proclamation stating that “a tattoo is 
primal parent of the visual arts . . . . It has reemerged as a fine art 
attracting highly skilled and trained practitioners. Current creative 
 
 20. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  
 21. Id. at 377; see also Anderson v. City of Hemosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1059 n.3 
(9th Cir. 2010).  
 22. As a corollary, there are of course certain types of “pure” speech which are given no 
protection under the Constitution. These include perjury, libel, slander, infringing on 
copyrights, and other forms of “fighting words.” See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 
417 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (per curiam). However, since this presumptively 
unprotected speech is not at issue with the creation of a tattoo, such a discussion does not 
warrant much attention.  
 23. Spence, 418 U.S. at 409.  
 24. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 
 25. Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285 (2000). 
 26. Enid Schildkrout, Inscribing the Body, 33 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 319, 325 
(2004).  
 27. David Morton, Tattooing, INVENTION & TECH., Winter 2002, at 36, 40.  
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approaches . . . [infuse] this traditional discipline with new vigor and 
meaning.”28 Most courts today recognize that a tattoo itself is 
considered to be “pure” First Amendment speech.29 
A tattoo is created through a surgical process by which dye is 
injected “into the recipient’s skin by the use of needles or 
machines.”30 Generally, an electronic tattoo machine is used to 
create the tattoo, which commands a needle to puncture the skin.31 
Ink is injected into the second layer of skin, and the result is 
“essentially an open wound.”32 Because the process involves 
puncturing skin and interaction with blood, there is a risk of 
transmission of disease.33 As such, certain risks include infection, 
tuberculosis, hepatitis B and C, and HIV.34 To guard against the 
spread of disease, many states and cities have passed regulations to 
monitor tattoo parlors and ensure that proper instruments and 
cleaning measures are being employed.35 
Of course, behind the tattoo is the tattoo artist. Tattoo artists 
learn the trade through apprenticeships that allow them to learn the 
art and work the machines. Tattoo artists typically work either in a 
“tattoo parlor” or a “tattoo art studio.”36 A tattoo is ultimately 
created through collaboration between the recipient and the tattoo 
artist.37 Tattoo artists have been compared to painters, sculptors, and 
other artists who are commissioned to produce a piece of art in 
exchange for money.38 
 
 28. Hoag Levins, The Changing Cultural Status of the Tattoo Arts in America, TATTOO 
ARTS IN AM., http://www.tattooartist.com/history.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).  
 29. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1060 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“There appears to be little dispute that the tattoo itself is pure First Amendment ‘speech.’”). 
 30. Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (D. Minn. 1980).  
 31. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1055–56 (citing the city’s declaration).  
 32. Id.  
 33. See Body Art: Tattoos and Piercings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/features/bodyart/ (last updated Jan. 21, 2008). 
 34. Id.  
 35. See, e.g., COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA, MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 4.05 (2010), available at 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=16299&stateId=15&stateName=Iowa.  
 36. See Levins, supra note 28.  
 37. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1057 (citing declaration submitted by Anderson 
describing his own approach to tattooing).  
 38. Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual Property 
Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 104 (2003). 
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C. Tattoo Jurisprudence: Yurkew and Hold Fast Tattoo 
Anderson is not the first case to raise the issue of tattoo parlors 
and First Amendment jurisprudence. In fact, several courts have 
already encountered the issue, in most cases finding that tattoo 
parlors are generally not protected forms of speech under the First 
Amendment.  
Thirty years ago, in the seminal case of Yurkew v. Sinclair,39 a 
Minnesota court considered whether the Minnesota State Fair Board 
of Managers could refuse to rent space to a tattooist.40 The board 
denied the rental space because of health and safety concerns 
implicated in the tattooing process.41 The tattooist sued the 
Minnesota State Fair, arguing that tattooing is protected First 
Amendment speech and that the restriction was a prior restraint.42 
The Minnesota court initially concluded that the process of tattooing 
was expressive conduct rather than pure speech, and thus the main 
question to decide was “whether the actual process of tattooing, as 
opposed to the image conveyed by the tattoo itself, is sufficiently 
imbued with elements of communication” as required under the 
Spence test.43 The court ultimately found that the tattooing process is 
not communicative in nature and thus does not implicate the First 
Amendment.44 
In so holding, the Yurkew court stated that the tattooist made 
“no showing that the normal observer or even the recipient would 
regard the process of injecting dye into a person’s skin through the 
use of needles as communicative.”45 Under the Spence test, 
communicative activity requires “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message,”46 and that the circumstances surrounding 
the conduct would likely provide “that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”47 Because the surgical process 
does not, in itself, communicate a message that the average observer 
 
      39.  495 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980). 
 40. Id. at 1249–50. 
 41. Id. at 1249. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 1253 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 
U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974)).  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 1254.  
 46. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11.  
 47. Id. at 411. 
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could interpret, the Minnesota district court rejected the tattooist’s 
argument.48 
More recently, in 2008, a U.S. district court in Illinois 
encountered a similar question concerning a city’s denial of a tattoo 
shop’s request for a special use permit. In Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. 
City of North Chicago49 a tattoo shop claimed that the denial of the 
permit violated the First Amendment.50 Taking a page from Yurkew, 
the court presumed that the process of tattooing was expressive 
conduct, as opposed to pure speech, because “the act itself is not 
intended to convey a particularized message.”51 Specifically, the 
court compared the tattoo artist to a sound truck vehicle, in which 
the vehicle allows a person to convey a message, but the truck itself is 
not expressive.52 In sum, the court found that tattooing is not 
protected speech under the First Amendment.53 
Consistent with Yurkew and Hold Fast Tattoo, several other 
courts have also found that tattooing is not protected under the First 
Amendment. In Kennedy v. Hughes,54 the Delaware district court 
concluded that operating a tattoo parlor does not involve a 
“fundamental” right.55 In People v. O’Sullivan,56 the Supreme Court 
of New York perfunctorily held that even if tattooing constituted 
pure speech or symbolic speech, it may be subject to “reasonable 
regulation in the public interest and [the] right to engage in 
tattooing is not paramount to the public’s right to good health.”57 
These decisions set the backdrop for the Ninth Circuit’s encounter 
with Anderson and his tattoo parlor request.  
 
 48. Yurkew, 495 F. Supp. at 1254. 
 49. 580 F. Supp. 2d 656 (N.D. Ill. 2008).  
 50. Id. at 659. 
 51. Id. at 660 (refusing to engage in a dialogue about conduct versus pure speech and 
stating that the “act of tattooing fails the first prong of this test because the act itself is not 
intended to convey a particularized message”). 
 52. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)) (describing a loud 
sound truck as unprotected First Amendment speech).  
 53. Id.  
 54. 596 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Del. 1984). 
 55. Id. at 1493. 
 56. 409 N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. Div. 1978).  
 57. Id. at 333 (citations omitted).  
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IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
In Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, the Ninth Circuit found 
the provision banning tattoo parlors within the city in Hermosa 
Beach’s Municipal Code § 17.06.070 facially unconstitutional.58 
Significantly, the court concluded that because tattooing is purely 
expressive activity, not expressive conduct, there is no need to 
determine whether tattooing is “sufficiently imbued” with 
communicative aspects as required under the Spence test.59 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit determined that an absolute ban on 
tattoo parlors is not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.60  
A. Discarding the “Sufficiently Imbued” Test: Tattooing as Pure Speech 
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis proceeded by rejecting the 
underlying premise that had previously propelled the long line of 
tattoo decisions. The court found that, as opposed to symbolic 
conduct, such as burning a draft card, “tattooing is more akin to 
traditional modes of expression (like writing).”61 Therefore, the 
“sufficiently imbued” test is inapplicable because tattooing is purely 
expressive speech. 
The Ninth Circuit engaged in a three-step approach to 
determine that the tattooing process is protected pure speech. The 
reasoning went as follows: (1) tattoos are expressive, protected 
speech; (2) speech includes the process of creating that speech; and 
therefore, (3) the process of tattooing is necessarily protected speech.  
First, the Ninth Circuit found that there is “little dispute” that 
tattoos are considered expressive speech.62 The United States 
Supreme Court has found various forms of entertainment to be 
expressive activities, including dance, parades, movies, and music.63 
Because tattoos consist of images, symbols, and words,64 there is 
little difference between a tattoo and a painting.65 The Ninth Circuit 
further explained that there is no difference between injecting dye 
 
 58. 621 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1062.  
 62. Id. at 1060.  
 63. Id.   
      64. Id. at 1061. 
 65. Id.   
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onto a piece of paper as opposed to in a person’s skin.66 Therefore, 
because paintings and other forms of communication are protected, 
tattoos should be protected as well.67 
Second, when speech is protected, the medium of the speech is 
likewise protected. Because “the process of expression through a 
medium has never been thought so distinct from the expression 
itself,”68 it would be contradictory to separate the process of creating 
the expression, such as a printing press or artist brushes, from the 
expression. Therefore, because the process of tattooing as performed 
in a tattoo parlor constitutes the medium of expression, it is 
protected under the broad umbrella of protected speech that 
accompanies a tattoo.  
B. Absolute Ban as a Time, Place or Manner Restriction 
Next, the court found that an absolute ban on tattoo parlors in a 
city is not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.69 Even if 
speech is protected, cities may limit the speech in their own 
legitimate interests.70 However, the restriction must: (1) be content-
neutral, (2) be narrowly tailored, and (3) leave open alternative 
channels of communication.71 
Here, the Ninth Circuit found that an absolute ban of all tattoo 
parlors in Hermosa Beach was not narrowly tailored and did not 
leave open alternative channels of communication.72 While the city 
argued that the absolute ban was narrowly tailored—as Los Angeles 
County lacks the resources to monitor the hundreds of tattooists 
working there—the court rejected this reasoning by stating that the 
city cannot use its own refusal to allocate resources as a means to 
create a broad-based prohibition.73 Similarly, the court found that 
alternative channels of communication are not available if tattoo 
establishments are prohibited because a tattoo is a unique form of 
communication that “often carries a message quite distinct from 
displaying the same words or picture through some other 
 
      66.  Id.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1061–62. 
 69. Id. at 1068. 
 70. Id. at 1064. 
 71. Id. at 1064–66. 
 72. Id. at 1068. 
 73. Id. at 1065.  
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medium.”74 The court focused on the increasing popularity of 
tattoos, citing a 2006 survey stating that 36% of people from ages 
eighteen to twenty-five have tattoos, and 40% of people from ages 
twenty-six to forty have tattoos.75 These numbers suggest that 
tattoos are becoming an increasingly important and distinct form of 
communication.76 For these reasons, the court found that the ban on 
Hermosa Beach tattoo parlors was not a reasonable restriction.77 
V. ANALYSIS 
In light of prior decisions on the issue of tattoos and free speech, 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anderson raises some interesting 
questions. Jesse Choper, an expert on the First Amendment and a 
law professor at the University of California, Berkeley, commented 
that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Anderson constituted a “clear, 
uncontroversial application of the First Amendment.”78 However, 
while Choper believes that Anderson was a “pretty straightforward 
case,”79 it is hard to comprehend how, if he is correct, nearly every 
other court confronting the issue in the past thirty years got it 
wrong.80 Indeed, this warrants further analysis into the Ninth 
Circuit’s underlying premise and its inquiry into the art of tattooing 
and free speech generally. Under this analysis, the Anderson court 
correctly decided that tattooing should be considered purely 
expressive First Amendment activity but erred in concluding that the 
ban was not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction. 
 
 74. Id. at 1067 (citation omitted).  
 75. Id. at 1066 (citing PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, HOW 
YOUNG PEOPLE VIEW THEIR LIVES, FUTURES AND POLITICS: A PORTRAIT OF “GENERATION 
NEXT” 21 (2007), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/300.pdf). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1064. 
 78. Paul Elias, Appeals Court Ends Tattoo Parlor Ban in Calif City, ABC NEWS (U.S.) 
(Sept. 9, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=11595461. 
 79. Id.  
 80. See, e.g., Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of N. Chi., 580 F. Supp. 2d 656 (N.D. Ill. 
2008); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980); State v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986); People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. Div. 1978); State v. 
White, 560 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 2002); Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, Ltd. v. City of Norfolk, 72 
Va. Cir. 388 (2007).  
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A. Tattoos as a “Venerable Means of Communication” 
After more than thirty years of conflicting decisions, the Ninth 
Circuit finally turned the tide of tattoo jurisprudence by holding that 
tattoos constitute a protected form of pure speech. Surprisingly, just 
two years ago, a U.S. district court in Illinois concluded that tattoos 
are not protected speech.81 This departure is significant, raising the 
intriguing question: What has changed?  
The answer: not much. The Ninth Circuit simply questioned the 
underlying premise that several courts merely assumed was true—
that the tattooing process is distinct from the tattoo. Certainly this 
distinction makes little sense. Courts have not separated the act of 
painting from the finished product, or a printing press from the 
newspaper product. The Supreme Court, in Minneapolis Star & 
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,82 declined to 
make such a distinction when it held that a tax on newspaper ink 
may improperly burden the dissemination of the newspaper.83 
However, the previous tattoo-ban cases have deliberately segregated 
the act of tattooing from the tattoo itself.  
Perhaps one explanation for the shortcomings of other courts is 
the emphasis on the health and safety concerns of tattooing. While 
tattooing involves the transmission of blood, and possibly disease, no 
such risk exists for a pen-and-ink drawing. However, as observed by 
the Ninth Circuit judges during oral arguments in Anderson, a 
painter may very well use lead ink in making a portrait, which could 
cause lead poisoning, but the act of painting, as well as the painting 
itself, is still protected speech.84  
Similarly, the negative, transgressive qualities of tattoos may have 
played a part in other courts’ refusals to accept the process of 
tattooing as protected activity. Previously, tattoos were believed to 
be a degraded art left to the “lower class.”85 Notably, however, the 
Ninth Circuit went to great lengths to demonstrate tattoos’ 
increasing acceptance in traditional social circles and also explained 
 
 81. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
 82. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).  
 83. Id. at 592–93. 
 84. Oral Argument at 22:13, Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 08-56914), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage. 
php?pk_id=0000005493. 
 85. See Randolph I. Geare, Tattooing, SCI. AM., Sept. 12, 1903, at 189.  
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how tattoos have “increased in prevalence and sophistication.”86 
More significantly, the increasing social acceptance of tattoos 
signifies that, as compared with thirty years ago, tattoos are now 
perceived as “communicative” in nature. While in the past, body art 
was generally understood as a barbaric practice received with 
repugnance by mainstream culture, the Ninth Circuit entered into a 
detailed description of how a tattoo makes a statement of “autonomy 
and self-fashioning.”87 Therefore, while the First Amendment 
jurisprudence on this issue seems to have remained relatively 
unaltered in recent years, the perception surrounding tattoos as 
speech seems to have changed.  
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s inquiry into the history and 
communicative nature of tattooing reflects the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
approach to First Amendment issues. Indeed, unlike the other courts 
that have confronted tattoo parlor bans, the Ninth Circuit engaged 
in an extensive discussion about the “decorative; religious; magical; 
punitive”88 nature of tattoos. This analysis mirrors the Supreme 
Court’s historical account in United States v. Stevens,89 in which the 
Court engaged in an extensive discussion of the history of animal 
cruelty to find that depictions of maiming and mutilation are not 
likely protected under the First Amendment.90 While historical 
evidence is not necessary for First Amendment protection, the Court 
noted that the Constitution is not a document “prescribing limits, 
and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.”91 
Moreover, perhaps what occurred in Anderson that was absent 
from the prior tattoo-parlor ban cases was that the court recognized 
an amorphous line between pure speech and symbolic conduct. 
Where a tattoo transforms from serving as merely a symbol of an idea 
to become the very representation of the idea itself is a line that 
courts should not have to draw. After all, such a determination 
 
 86. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1066. 
 87. Id. at 1067 (citing Susan Benson, Inscriptions of the Self: Reflections on Tattooing 
and Piercing in Contemporary Euro-America, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY: THE TATTOO IN 
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN HISTORY 251–52 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000)).  
 88. Id. at 1061 (citing Mark Gustafson, The Tattoo in the Later Roman Empire and 
Beyond, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY, supra note 87, at 17).  
 89. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).  
 90. Id. at 1585–86.  
 91. Id. at 1585 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch), 178 (1803)). 
Note, however, that the statute in Stevens was ultimately held to be unconstitutional as it was 
impermissibly overbroad. Id. at 1592.  
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would change with each tattoo and every person who receives a 
tattoo. For some, a navy anchor tattoo may represent service in the 
military, but for others, the navy anchor may merely serve as a 
decorative design, symbolizing nothing more than the anchor itself. 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit recognized that for First Amendment cases 
it is better to err on the side of permission than prohibition.92  
B. Hermosa Beach’s Ban Is Reasonable in Los Angeles County 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit fell short in its analysis of 
Hermosa Beach’s ban as an unreasonable time, place, or manner 
restriction. After accepting tattooing as expressive activity, the court 
proceeded to invalidate the ordinance on two grounds: that the ban 
was not narrowly tailored, and that it did not leave open alternative 
channels of communication.93 Specifically, the court focused on the 
fact that as a general proposition, absolute bans are disfavored in 
First Amendment case law.94 While this may be true, this broad 
proposition should not apply to the 1.5 square miles comprising 
Hermosa Beach.  
1. Narrowly tailored 
In order for a time, place, or manner restriction to be upheld on 
free speech grounds, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest.95 Anderson did not dispute that the 
health and safety concerns of tattooing serve a government interest. 
Rather, Anderson claimed, and the court agreed, that tattooing can 
be conducted safely, and that the failure of the city to appropriate 
the proper number of health inspectors cannot be a means to restrict 
free speech.96  
The problem with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis is that while 
tattooing may be conducted safely in some circumstances, tattooing 
presents other risk factors that can lead to crime and drug use. For 
instance, tattooing presents specific risk factors for adolescents and 
 
 92. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 474 (2007) 
(“Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.”). 
 93. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1068. 
 94. Id. at 1064. 
 95. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (“[A]s is true of 
other ordinances, when a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly 
drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest.”). 
 96. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1065.  
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teens, for whom tattoos have generally been found to accompany 
“low self-esteem, delinquency, [and] drug abuse.”97 Moreover, while 
health regulations often address the use of sterile equipment, diseases 
may be transferred through the ink or the string that is used to 
transmit the ink.98 Furthermore, what distinguishes tattooing from 
other potentially infection-creating trades, such as nail salons and 
barber shops, is that tattooing is closely associated with the drug 
culture and transmission of HIV and hepatitis.99 In other forms of 
problematic speech, like live entertainment and hand billing, the 
government is concerned about litter, parking, and neighborhood 
deterioration.100 Risks associated with tattooing are certainly more 
immediate and hazardous than those of littering and parking. 
Similarly, while the Ninth Circuit alleged that health and safety 
regulations are a narrowly tailored means to confront the risks of 
tattooing as opposed to an outright ban, there is no information 
suggesting that such regulations improve the problem areas of 
tattooing. For instance, unreported or unlicensed tattoo artists 
operating in basements and homes are unlikely to be affected by 
health regulations. Indeed, in a Minnesota study on the relationship 
between government regulation and tattooists’ response to such 
regulation, artists who self-reported responded favorably to 
government regulation, but problem areas still existed with artists 
who did not report.101 In fact, “tattooists most in need of 
improvement [from government regulation] may be hardest to reach 
due to their opposition to the government.”102 This difficulty is in 
keeping with the culture of the tattoo industry, which has often been 
resistant to government involvement.103 
 
 97. Ronald L. Braithwaite et al., Risks Associated with Tattooing and Body Piercing, 20 J. 
PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 459, 459 (1999).  
 98. Id. at 461.  
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 73 (relating that the ban on live entertainment is 
arguably based on issues related to “parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities”). 
 101. Monica J. Raymond, Linda L. Halcón & Phyllis L. Pirie, Regulation of Tattooing in 
Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota: Tattooists’ Attitudes and Relationship Between Regulation 
and Practice, 188 PUB. HEALTH REP. 154, 160 (2003). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 159 tbl.3 (detailing widely varying opinions among tattooists as to proper 
extent of government regulation, including restrictions on purchasing tattooing equipment, 
giving tattoos to minors, and involvement of persons with bloodborne illnesses).  
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2. Alternative channels of communication 
The court proceeded to conclude that an absolute ban on tattoo 
parlors would not leave open alternative channels of communication 
to those who desired a tattoo. The Ninth Circuit focused on the 
Supreme Court’s general disfavor of broad prophylactic prohibitions 
on speech. Citing cases such as City of Ladue v. Gilleo104 and Schad v. 
Borough of Mount Ephraim,105 the court concluded that as a rule, 
absolute bans are rejected.106 However, the court’s analysis was 
flawed: the regulations in Ladue and Schad were not struck down 
because they were blanket prohibitions per se, but because the 
nature of the speech conformed to the surrounding area107 and the 
government interest did not outweigh the First Amendment 
rights.108 Indeed, in Schad, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
municipal ordinance that prohibited all nude dancing in the city, but 
the Court held that the “[t]he situation would be quite different if 
the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting 
access to, lawful speech.”109 The Schad Court observed that there 
was no evidence in the record that the kind of dancing that was 
prohibited by the ordinance was available in close-by areas outside of 
the city.110 
Here, what the court failed to mention, and what was incorrectly 
stated in the oral arguments by Anderson’s counsel, is that Los 
Angeles County, of which Hermosa Beach is only a small part, 
generally allows tattoo parlors subject to licensing requirements.111 
Indeed, Anderson’s other tattoo parlor is located in the town of 
Gardena,112 only eight miles away from Hermosa Beach.113 While the 
 
 104. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).  
 105. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).  
 106. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 107.  Schad, 452 U.S. at 76. 
 108. Id. at 72; Ladue, 512 U.S. at 54.  
 109. Schad, 452 U.S. at 76 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 
n.35 (1976)).  
 110. Id. 
 111. See LOS ANGELES CNTY. CODE § 7.94.020(A) (2010), available at 
http://search.municode.com/html/16274/index.htm (“No person shall own or operate a 
body art establishment or permit the conduct of body art activity at any location unless and 
until a body art establishment license has been procured . . . .”).  
 112. See Elias, supra note 78. 
 113. Driving Directions from Hermosa Beach, CA to Yer Cheat’n Heart Tattoo, 
Gardena, CA, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink; 
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court may have been correct in determining that a large-scale time, 
place, or manner restriction in all of Los Angeles County may be 
overly broad, certainly this is not the case in the present action. The 
Hermosa Beach ban merely restricted access to tattoos in Hermosa 
Beach, not all access; as residents would only need to travel five 
minutes, or walk ten blocks, to a neighboring city to find a tattoo 
artist.114  
Unfortunately, the court was so committed to invalidating the 
tattoo parlor ban that it failed to consider the city’s location and its 
place in the larger community of Los Angeles. Contrary to the Ninth 
Circuit’s characterization, a prohibition in Hermosa Beach would 
not foreclose all opportunities for obtaining a tattoo in tattoo parlors 
in Los Angeles County.  
Finally, the court engaged in a discussion of how tattoos are a 
“distinct” method of communication carrying a unique message.115 
This analysis misses the mark. The Hermosa Beach time, place, or 
manner restriction bans tattoo parlors, not tattoos. Determining the 
validity of a time, place, or manner restriction is an inquiry apart 
from the pure speech versus conduct dichotomy discussed earlier.116 
In the latter, the tattoo and the tattoo process are necessarily 
intertwined. But for the former, regulations restricting the manner of 
expression are not the same as restricting the expression itself. The 
court engages in an analysis assuming that regulation of the 
tattooing process is the same as limiting tattoos entirely. As 
mentioned earlier, this is not the case. Hermosa Beach does not ban 
tattoos, merely tattoo parlors. Certainly a ban in a city with limited 
space and neighboring cities that permit tattoo parlors is not 
unreasonable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach is a landmark decision in 
several respects. Finally, after more than thirty years, tattoo parlors 
are recognized as a protected medium of pure speech, not conduct. 
 
then search “A” for “Hermosa Beach, CA” and search “B” for “Yer Cheat’n Heart Tattoo, 
Gardena, CA”; then follow “Get Directions” hyperlink). 
 114. See Tattoo Parlors in Redondo Beach, CA, GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://maps.google.com (search for “tattoo parlors”; then zoom in on Redondo Beach, CA) 
(showing two tattoo parlors in Torrance and one in Gardena). 
 115. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 116.  See supra Part IV.A. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 7:57 PM 
131 Preserving Access to Tattoos 
 147 
The Ninth Circuit’s articulation of tattooing as a protected form of 
communication effectively closed the door to years of dispute. 
However, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider Hermosa Beach’s 
specific circumstances in concluding that the restriction was an 
invalid time, place, or manner restriction. Indeed, it appeared that 
the court was so concerned with making a statement about the 
impropriety of such tattoo prohibitions that it failed to analyze the 
realities of Hermosa Beach. While tattoo parlors should be protected 
under the First Amendment, they should still be capable of being 
regulated under proper time, place, or manner restrictions. 
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